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Introduction 
 
The pricing of new health technologies, such as drugs or devices, involves 
deciding how the economic surplus generated by the new technology is shared 
between the producer and consumer. In theory this division is determined by the 
market-clearing price. However, in health care markets, third party payers act 
for patients, and suppliers of technologies have patent protection, so the price of 
a new technology has to be agreed by these two parties. 
 
There are several rules for the pricing of new health technologies, in particular 
drugs, but the majority of health economists consider value-based pricing to be 
the method of choice (Claxton, 2007). This approach is now well-established in 
those countries, such as the United Kingdom, that use health technology 
assessment, incorporating economic evaluation, as a basis for recommending the 
reimbursement or use of new technologies. Under this approach, the price of the 
new technology is determined by the maximum price that would result in the 
incremental cost- effectiveness ratio (ICER) of the new technology  (compared to 
current care) being no more than the decision-making Ǯǯof the third 
party payer in the jurisdiction concerned. Value-based pricing (VBP) is 
considered by many to be far superior to most of the alternatives, such as 
uninformed price negotiations, or internal or external reference pricing 
(Drummond et al, 1997).  
 
However, there are issues in the application of VBP, with differences of opinion Ǯǯ about Ǯ-
effectiveness tǯ to be judged (Danzon et al, 2018).  
For example, should it be determined based on the current marginal productivity 
of the health care system, so as to avoid any loss in health when new 
technologies are introduced, or should it reflect the preferences of citizens for 
additional spending on health and health related gain, so that optimal levels of 
industry R&D will incentivized (Danzon et al., 2015) Some have criticized the 
concept of VBP, arguing that it may enable innovators to extract too much value 
from their innovations, at the expense of value to the public (Mazzucato, 2018).   
Therefore, this paper discusses whether an alternative approach, rate of return 
pricing, could be useful in situations where, for whatever reason, VBP is 
considered to be inappropriate. 
 
When might value-based pricing be considered to be inappropriate? 
 
The first case where value-based pricing might be deemed to be inappropriate is 
in the pricing of treatments for ultra-rare diseases. Here, treatments such as 
enzyme-replacement, can cost as much as $500,000 per year. So even if they 
extended life at full health, it is unlikely that they could ever be considered to be 
cost-effective when judged against conventional standards.  In addition, these 
therapies often fulfill a previously unmet need and therefore there is no existing 
therapy to be replaced, which might generate cost-offsets. Therefore, if, for 
whatever reason, it is decided to reimburse these therapies, VBP is unlikely to be 
helpful in setting an appropriate price, since the price will be too low, either to 
encourage manufacturers to launch the products, or, in the long run, to stimulate 
research into rare conditions.  
However, by departing from the VBP, Coté and Keating (2012) argue that policy 
makers are at risk being exploited by manufacturers and patient groups, since 
their µwillingness to pay is high, because of the seriousness of the disease, the 
absence of treatment alternatives, and the possibility of identifying the individuals and 
families affected by the decision¶. They point out that orphan drugs have become a 
µhighly lucrative opportunity for manufacturers¶, since µin 2008, of 18 products 
intended solely for the treatment of a rare disease 11 had achieved global annual sales 
equal to or greater than $1 billion during the 7-year exclusivity period granted by the 
)'$¶  
 
A second case where the VBP may be deemed inappropriate is in the pricing of Ǯǯǡherapy, for conditions that are currently being treated at 
great expense. For example, suppose that a gene therapy became available for 
those patients on long-term haemodialysis. If the need for life-long dialysis could 
be obviated, such a cure could be worth millions of dollars based on cost savings 
from current care alone. If the new therapy was considered to offer a higher 
quality of care, the price implied by an ICER up to the ǯ 
decision-making threshold would likely be even higher. Therefore, such a 
treatment could command an exceptionally high price if VBP were applied.  
 
Of course, considering VBP to be Ǯeǯ(either Ǯtoo highǯ or Ǯtoo lowǯ) in 
these situations is itself a value judgment. It might be argued that, in the case of 
rare diseases, therapy should not be made available unless manufacturers were 
willing to drop their prices dramatically (McCabe et al, 2005), or alternatively, in 
the case of Ǯcures,ǯ that exceptionally high rewards should be given to 
manufacturers who discover a replacement for highly expensive therapies, or 
which transform life expectancy or quality of life. However, we argue that many 
health care payers would have difficulties with both of these propositions.  
 
Of course, payers can negotiate with the manufacturer in these situations. For 
example, in the case of a cure for a disease currently being treated with an 
expensive therapy, they could argue that current therapy itself is not cost-
effective and therefore not the appropriate comparator for new treatment, or 
that any savings from replacing the current, expensive, therapy should be shared 
between the manufacturer and the payer. However, in such a negotiation, policy 
makers need guidance on what might constitute a reasonable price, if the VBP is 
not deemed to be appropriate.  
 
 
Rate of return pricing 
 
As the name implies, rate of return pricing is based on ensuring a pre-specified 
rate of return to manufacturers, after covering the costs of developing and 
marketing the product. It has been used in the pricing of the products of public 
utilities, and in the defence industry outside of the procurement of finished 
products. The latter case is closest to the pharmaceutical industry, as, like 
pharmaceuticals, new defence products, such as a fighter plane, are developed as 
a result of a long term and costly research and development programme. In 
order to help arms manufacturers limit their financial risk, the purchasers of 
arms, usually the government, guarantee a given rate return on costs, often 
negotiated by reference to the industry average rate of  return. 
 
Rate of return pricing is not entirely unknown in the health care industry. In the 
United Kingdom, the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme limits the profits Ǯlaw-ǯ if these exceed an agreed level, 
although the prices of individual drugs in the UK are increasingly being 
determined based on value for money criteria.  
 
However, rate of return pricing has its critics. The first concern is that is often 
difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the true costs of developing and 
marketing a given product and there is considerable scope for manufacturers to 
inflate costs through accounting practices. Secondly, if the manufacturers know 
in advance that their costs will be covered, they have few incentives to be 
efficient in the research and development process. This is a particular problem in 
the defence sector, where the technical challenges to achieve product 
specification may be great and projects often overrun in both cost and time, 
pushing up procurement costs. A third challenge is that RoR pricing discourages 
competitive entry as returns are capped, reducing the incentive for others to 
enter offering a better product. Fourthly, the rate of return may be set too low 
(deterring innovation) or too high (encouraging excessive innovation).  
 
 
Could rate of return pricing be helpful in health care? 
 
In the first of the situations discussed above, Berdud et al (2018) have proposed 
a rate of return approach for establishing a reasonable price for an orphan drug. 
Acknowledging the concerns of Coté and Keating (2012), they argued that 
although society may be willing to sacrifice some health gain overall to make 
treatments for orphan diseases available, it would not tolerate a situation 
whereby the manufacturers of these drugs make substantially higher profits 
than those manufacturers of drugs for non-orphan conditions.  
 
Therefore, they proposed the derivation of an adjusted cost-effectiveness 
threshold, based on the differences between orphan and non-orphan drugs, both 
in the relative costs of research and development and the relative size of the 
anticipated patient population. (Research and development costs are likely to be 
lower for orphan drugs, as the Phase III trials are typically smaller, but revenues 
are also likely to be lower because of the small patient population.)They argued 
that the adjusted threshold determined by the equivalence of rates of return 
would imply a higher price than the VBP, giving an indication of the maximum 
price society might pay in order to make these drugs available to patients. They 
were careful to point out that this did not indicate a price that society should pay, 
but that it could provide some reassurance to policy makers that, although they 
were paying more than the VBP, they were not paying excessive prices in order 
to make these drugs available. That is, the rate of return price might serve as a 
useful benchmark in the price negotiation. 
 
In considering the second case, Ǯǯs available for a disease 
that currently has high treatment costs, the value-based price might be very high. 
Here, a price based on rate of return would likely be lower than the valueȂbased 
price and could be viewed as the minimum price society might be willing to pay. 
Again, this does not indicate that this is the price society should pay, as a higher 
price might be justified in terms of rewarding the manufacturer for an important 
innovation in care. However, the rate of return price might again serve as a 
useful benchmark in the price negotiation. 
 
Practical challenges in using rate of return pricing 
 
Using rate of return pricing for pharmaceuticals gives rise to a number of 
challenges. First, the high failure rates in drug discovery mean that most R&D 
does not lead to a product. Therefore, the cost of failures has to be factored in to 
the calculation of the rate of return price and there are likely to be differences in 
opinion on how this should be done. Secondly, R&D in pharmaceuticals is a 
global activity and manufacturing plants supply many countries. Rules for 
allocating these global costs between countries are inevitably arbitrary.  Thirdly, 
as mentioned above, rate of return pricing would not give enough incentives for 
manufacturers to be cost effective in research, nor to pursue the most important 
(valuable) disease targets, as the allowed return would be the same whatever 
area is explored. Finally, capping returns reduces the incentive for competitive 
entry, and setting the rate too low will discourage R&D investments valued by 
society. 
 
In the case of ultra orphans, Berdud et al (2018) avoid most of these challenges 
by proposing an adjustment to ǯcost-effectiveness threshold for 
differences in average cost and revenue for drugs in different bands of patient 
population size, rather than obtaining cost information for individual products. 
This approach gives an incentive for generating more QALYs and does not 
reward an individual company for having higher than average R&D costs.  A Ǯǯ, however, may well be cost-effective at the ICER threshold, so alternative 
proxy approaches will be required Ȃ in this case to adjust the threshold 
downwards. These could be based on industry averages for R&D costs, success 
rates, and rates of return on investment, but include a premium return to reflect 
the priority society gives to getting cures. However, it would be important to 
avoid setting the RoR price based on product specific costs, since this would 
encourage a cost-plus approach by the company concerned. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
We conclude that there may be a role for rate of return pricing in situations 
where the value-based price is considered to be inappropriate. We also show 
that the rate of return price could be higher or lower than the value-based price, 
depending on the particular situation. However, in these situations the rate of 
return price could be considered as a guide for policy makers, who may then 
wish to negotiate higher or lower prices, depending on whether they consider 
other factors, such as rewarding innovation, or ensuring equal access to the new 
health care technology, are important. 
 
If rate of return pricing were to be applied, it would be important to find ways of 
dealing with the problems of accurately estimating development costs and 
providing incentives to manufacturers to be as efficient as possible in the R&D 
process. We have suggested the development of proxy methods that do not 
involve obtaining research and product cost information from individual 
companies, or require attribution of cost to individual markets. Finally, attention 
would also need to be given to driving the direction of R&D in health and 
medicine. If value-based pricing were universally applied, it would not only 
improve the efficiency of current care, but also drive research towards the 
discovery of high value treatments in the future. This incentive would be largely 
absent in a world of rate of return pricing, and it would be important for society 
to find other ways of incentivising the types of research that it would like to see. 
This could involve governments funding clinical development directly, taking on 
the cost of failure, which is unlikely to be a sensible use of health system 
resources, or setting higher rates of allowable returns for priority areas, which 
would mimic one of the desirable effects of using value-based pricing. 
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